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The European Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued an updated advisory on global navigation satellite system (GNSS) outages and navigation disruptions

The European Union Aviation Safety Agency (EASA) has issued a revised Safety Information Bulletin (SIB No. 2022-02R3) in response to Global Navigation Satellite System (GNSS) disruption and spoofing. This updated bulletin highlights the complexity and impact of GNSS disruptions and spoofing behaviours, which have become a major aviation safety concern. Below are the key elements and recommended measures of the bulletin:

Scope and Applicability:
This bulletin applies to competent authorities, air traffic management/air navigation services (ATM/ANS) providers, air operators, aircraft and equipment manufacturers, and organisations involved in the design or production of ATM/ANS equipment. The purpose is to inform these stakeholders of the risks associated with GNSS interference and the necessary precautions.

Increased Threats:
Since February 2022, there has been a significant increase in GNSS jamming and spoofing incidents, particularly affecting areas around conflict zones, as well as the southern and eastern Mediterranean, the Black Sea, the Middle East, the Baltic Sea and the Arctic. A full list of affected flight information regions is available on the EASA website.

Understanding interference and spoofing:
Jamming: deliberate radio frequency interference with GNSS signals to make the system inaccessible to users in the affected area.
Spoofing: the broadcasting of spoofed satellite signals to deceive GNSS receivers, resulting in incorrect position, navigation and timing data.

Observed Symptoms and Effects:
Symptoms of suspected GNSS spoofing include inconsistent navigation positions, anomalous differences between ground speed and true airspeed, time and date offsets, and false Terrain Awareness and Warning System (TAWS) alerts. These disturbances can lead to serious operational problems such as altered routes or diversions, loss of the Airborne Collision Avoidance System (ACAS), and misdirection of surveillance data.

Mitigation Recommendations:
EASA recommends the following measures to mitigate the risks associated with GNSS interference:

Contingency procedures: establish co-ordination procedures between authorities, ATM/ANS providers and airspace users.
Alternative navigation infrastructure: ensure that non-GNSS based systems such as ILS, DME and VOR stations are functioning properly.
Information collection and reporting: implement processes to collect and share GNSS degradation information.
Specific Recommendations:
For air operators: train flight crews to recognise and respond to GNSS interference, report any GNSS anomalies to air traffic services, assess operational risks and maintain alternative navigation procedures.
For ATM/ANS providers: establish monitoring and reporting processes for GNSS performance degradation, ensure that the ground navigation infrastructure supports non-GNSS procedures, provide navigational assistance and maintain communications coverage in the event of GNSS interference or spoofing.
For manufacturers: assessing the impact of GNSS interference on products and providing guidance to users and guidance to operators on managing GNSS-related issues.

It is worth noting that Septentrio offers a solution called the Septentrio Mosaic GNSS module, a multi-band, multi-constellation GPS/GNSS receiver designed to provide centimetre-level positioning accuracy in challenging environments. It supports all current and future GNSS satellite signals and has built-in advanced AIM+ technology for interference mitigation and anti-spoofing, ensuring optimal availability, reliability and accuracy. Ideally suited for use in applications such as robotics, autonomous systems, unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs), precision agriculture, and more, this module delivers high-performance positioning solutions, especially in the face of GNSS interference and spoofing threats.

Conclusion:
EASA will continue to monitor and assess the situation, although the current situation is not sufficient for an immediate safety directive or airworthiness action. Stakeholders are urged to implement recommended measures to mitigate the impact of GNSS interference and spoofing on aviation safety.

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